Abstract-Injecting false data attack is a well known serious threat to wireless sensor network, for which an adversary reports bogus information to sink causing error decision at upper level and energy waste in en-route nodes. In this paper, we propose a novel bandwidth-efficient cooperative authentication (BECAN) scheme for filtering injected false data. Based on the random graph characteristics of sensor node deployment and the cooperative bit-compressed authentication technique, the proposed BECAN scheme can save energy by early detecting and filtering the majority of injected false data with minor extra overheads at the en-route nodes. In addition, only a very small fraction of injected false data needs to be checked by the sink, which thus largely reduces the burden of the sink. Both theoretical and simulation results are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in terms of high filtering probability and energy saving.
D
UE to the fast booming of microelectro mechanical systems, wireless sensor networking has been subject to extensive research efforts in recent years. It has been well recognized as a ubiquitous and general approach for some emerging applications, such as environmental and habitat monitoring, surveillance and tracking for military [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . A wireless sensor network is usually composed of a large number of sensor nodes which are interconnected through wireless links to perform distributed sensing tasks. Each sensor node is low-cost but equipped with necessary sensing, data processing, and communicating components. Therefore, when a sensor node generates a report after being triggered by a special event, e.g., a surrounding temperature change, it will send the report to a data collection unit (also known as sink) through an established routing path [17] .
Wireless sensor networks are usually deployed at unattended or hostile environments. Therefore, they are very vulnerable to various security attacks, such as selective forwarding, wormholes, and sybil attacks [12] , [18] . In addition, wireless sensor networks may also suffer from injecting false data attack [10] . For an injecting false data attack, an adversary first compromises several sensor nodes, accesses all keying materials stored in the compromised nodes, and then controls these compromised nodes to inject bogus information and send the false data to the sink to cause upper-level error decision, as well as energy wasted in en-route nodes. For instance, an adversary could fabricate a wildfire event or report a wrong wildfire location information to the sink, then expensive resources will be wasted by sending rescue workers to a nonexisting or wrong wildfire location. Therefore, it is crucial to filter the false data as accurately as possible in wireless sensor networks. At the same time, if all false data are flooding into the sink simultaneously, then not only huge energy will be wasted in the en-route nodes, but also heavy verification burdens will undoubtedly fall on the sink. As a result, the whole network could be paralyzed quickly. Therefore, filtering false data should also be executed as early as possible to mitigate the energy waste. To tackle this challenging issue, some false data filtering mechanisms have been developed [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . Since most of these filtering mechanisms use the symmetric key technique, once a node is compromised, it is hard to identify the node. In other words, the compromised node can abuse its keys to generate false reports, and the reliability of the filtering mechanisms will be degraded.
In this paper, we propose a novel bandwidth-efficient cooperative authentication (BECAN) scheme for filtering injected false data in wireless sensor networks. Compared with the previously reported mechanisms, the BECAN scheme achieves not only high filtering probability but also high reliability. The main contributions of this paper are threefold.
. First, we study the random graph characteristics of wireless sensor node deployment, and estimate the probability of k-neighbors, which provides the necessary condition for BECAN authentication; . Second, we propose the BECAN scheme to filter the injected false data with cooperative bit-compressed authentication technique. With the proposed mechanism, injected false data can be early detected and filtered by the en-route sensor nodes. In addition, the accompanied authentication information is bandwidth-efficient; and . Third, we develop a custom Java simulator to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed BECAN scheme in terms of en-routing filtering probability and false negative rate on true reports. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the system model and design goal. In Section 3, we review some preliminaries including TinyECC-based noninteractive keypair establishment [19] and message authentication code in Z Z 2 n . Then, we present the BECAN scheme in Section 4, followed by the security analysis and performance evaluation in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. We review some related works in Section 7. In the end, we draw our conclusions in Section 8.
MODEL AND DESIGN GOAL
In this section, we formulate the network model, the security model, and identify the design goal.
Network Model
We consider a typical wireless sensor network which consists of a sink and a large number of sensor nodes N ¼ fN 0 ; N 1 ; . . .g randomly deployed at a certain interest region (CIR) with the area S. The sink is a trustable and powerful data collection device, which has sufficient computation and storage capabilities and is responsible for initializing the sensor nodes and collecting the data sensed by these nodes. Each sensor node N i 2 N is stationary in a location. For differentiation purpose, we assume each sensor node has a unique nonzero identifer. The communication is bidirectional, i.e., two sensor nodes within their wireless transmission range (R) may communicate with each other. Therefore, if a sensor node is close to the sink, it can directly contact the sink. However, if a sensor node is far from the transmission range of the sink, it should resort to other nodes to establish a route and then communicate with the sink. Formally, such a wireless sensor network, as shown in Fig. 1 , can be represented as an undirected graph G ¼ ðV; EÞ, where V ¼ fv 1 ; v 2 ; . . .g is the set of all sensors N ¼ fN 0 ; N 1 ; . . .g plus the sink, and E ¼ fðv i ; v j Þjv i ; v j 2 Vg is the set of edges. Let dðv i ; v j Þ denote as the distance between v i and v j , then each e ij , which indicates whether there exists a communication edge between two nodes v i and v j or not, is defined as
Let v 1 denote the sink. All sensor nodes V=fv 1 g ¼ fv 2 ; v 3 ; . . .g can run the Dijkstra shortest path algorithm (see Appendix) to find their shortest paths to the sink v 1 , only if the graph G ¼ ðV; EÞ is fully connected.
Probability of fully connected G ¼ ðV; EÞ. Assume that the positions of these vertexes V ¼ fv 0 ; v 1 ; . . .g are uniformly distributed in the area S with network density , where ¼ jVj S , and jVj denotes the cardinality of V. Based on the random graph theory, the probability that there are n nodes in an arbitrary region A with the area A is
To calculate the full connection probability P con , we first compute P iso , the isolation probability of any node in G ¼ ðV; EÞ, where a node is called isolated if there exists no link between it and any other nodes. In other words, in some circle coverage with the area R 2 , except one node lies at the center, no other node exists. If the border effects are neglected, we have
Based on the isolation probability P iso , we can compute the full connection probability P con [20] as
Fig . 2 shows the full connection probability P iso versus different transmission range R and jV j. It can be seen that the expected fully connected G ¼ ðV; EÞ can be achieved by choosing proper R and jV j. 
Security Model
Since a wireless sensor network is unattended, a malicious adversary may readily launch some security attacks to degrade the network functionalities. In addition, due to the low-cost constraints, sensor nodes N ¼ fN 0 ; N 1 ; . . .g are not equipped with expensive tamper-proof device and could be easily compromised in such an unprotected wireless sensor network. Therefore, in our security model, we assume an adversary A can compromise a fraction of sensor nodes and obtain their stored keying materials. Then, after being controlled and reprogrammed by the adversary A, these compromised sensor nodes can collude to launch some injected false data attacks.
Since our work focuses on filtering injected false data attack, other attacks launched by the compromised sensor nodes in wireless sensor network, such as building bogus routing information, selectively dropping true data packet, and creating routing loops to waste the energy of network [18] , are not addressed in this paper.
Design Goal
The design goal is to develop an efficient cooperative bandwidth-efficient authentication scheme for filtering the injected false data. Specifically, the following two desirable objectives will be achieved.
Early Detecting the Injected False Data by the En-Route Sensor Nodes
The sink is a powerful data collection device. Nevertheless, if all authentication tasks are fulfilled at the sink, it is undoubted that the sink becomes a bottleneck. At the same time, if too much injected false data floods into the sink, the sink will surely suffer from the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Therefore, it is critical to share the authentication tasks with the en-route sensor nodes such that the injected false data can be detected and discarded early. The earlier the injected false data is detected, the more energy can be saved in the whole network.
Achieving Bandwidth-Efficient Authentication
Since the sensor nodes are low-cost and energy constraint, it is desirable to design a bandwidth efficient authentication scheme.
PRELIMINARIES

TinyECC-Based Noninteractive Keypair Establishment
TinyECC is a configurable library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which allows flexible integration of ECC-based public key cryptography in sensor network applications. A substantially experimental evaluation using representative sensor platforms, such as MICAz [21] and Imote2 [22] , is performed, and the results show that the ready-to-use TinyECC is suitable for wireless sensor networks to provide convenient authentications and pairkey establishments [19] . 
Because of the hardness of Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problem, only v i and v j can secretly share a key. At the same time, the established keys are independent. In other words, if a sensor node v i is compromised, then the key k ij shared between v i and v j will be disclosed. However, the key k jj 0 shared between v j and another sensor node v j 0 is not affected. For unattended wireless sensor networks, the property of key independence is useful, since it can limit the scope of key disclosure to the adversary A.
Message Authentication Code in Z Z 2 n
Message authentication code (MAC) provides assurance to the recipient of the message which came from the expected sender and has not been altered in transit [24] . Let hðÁÞ be a secure cryptographic hash function [25] . A MAC in Z Z 2 n can be considered as a keyed hash, and defined as MACðm; k; nÞ ¼ hðmkkÞ mod 2 n ; ð6Þ where m; k; n are a message, a key, and an adjustable parameter, respectively. When n ¼ 1, MACðm; k; 1Þ provides one-bit authentication, which can filter a false message with the probability 1 2 ; while n ¼ , MACðm; k; Þ can filter a false message with a higher probability 1 À 
PROPOSED BECAN SCHEME
In this section, we will propose BECAN scheme for filtering injected false data in wireless sensor networks. Before proceeding the BECAN scheme, the design rationale is introduced.
Design Rationale
To filter the false data injected by compromised sensor nodes, the BECAN adopts cooperative neighbor Â router (CNR)-based filtering mechanism. As shown in Fig. 3 , in the CNR-based mechanism, when a source node N 0 is ready to send a report m to the sink via an established routing path R N0 : ½R 1 ! R 2 ! Á Á Á ! R l ! Sink, it first resorts to its k neighboring nodes N N 0 : fN 1 ; N 2 ; . . . ; N k g to cooperatively authenticate the report m, and then sends the report m and the authentication information MAC from N 0 [ N N 0 to the sink via routing R N0 , where
each mac ij , 0 i k; 1 j l, represents N i 's MAC on m for R j 's authentication, and each mac is represents N i 's MAC on m for the sink's authentication. As indicated in network model, the sink initializes all sensor nodes, then each sensor node shares its private key with the sink. At the same time, according to the TinyECC-based noninteractive keypair establishment [19] , the full bipartite key graph between N 0 [ N N0 and R N0 can be established, as shown in Fig. 4 . Because of the existence of full bipartite key graph, the MAC design is reasonable. Therefore, when a compromised sensor node sends a false data to the sink, the false data can be filtered if there is at least one uncompromised neighboring node participating in the reporting. To achieve the bandwidth-efficient authentication, each mac ij is set as one bit and each mac is is bits by using the above MAC in Z Z 2 n technique. Then, the scale of MAC is only ðl þ Þ Â ðk þ 1Þ bits.
Probability of k neighbors. In the cooperative CNRbased authentication, if the number of the neighbors of the source node is less than a preset threshold k, the MAC authentication does not work. Let P kÁneigh denote the probability that there are at least k neighbors in the transmission range of a source node, then
Fig . 5 shows the probability P kÁneigh in a parameterized wireless sensor network with different k, ð1 k 30Þ. It can be seen the expected high probability can be achieved when choosing a proper k, i.e., k 6. As a result, the CNRbased MAC authentication mechanism is feasible.
Description of BECAN Authentication
The BECAN authentication scheme consists of two phases: sensor nodes initialization and deployment, and sensed results reporting protocol.
Sensor Nodes Initialization and Deployment
Given the security parameter , the sink first chooses an elliptic curve ðEðIF p Þ; G; qÞ defined over IF p , where p is a large prime and G 2 EðIF p Þ is a base point of prime order q with jqj ¼ . Then, the sink selects a secure cryptographic hash function hðÞ, where h : f0; 1g Ã ! Z Z Ã q . Finally, the sink sets the public parameters as params ¼ fEðIF p Þ; G; q; hðÞg.
To initialize sensor nodes N ¼ fN 0 ; N 1 ; N 2 ; . . . ; g, the sink invokes the Algorithm 1. Then, the sink deploys these initialized sensor nodes at a CIR in various ways, such as by air or by land. Given the rich literature in wireless sensor node deployment [26] , [27] , we do not address the deployment in detail. Without loss of generality, we assume that all sensor nodes are uniformly distributed in CIR after deployment. When these sensor nodes are not occupied by the reporting task, they cooperatively establish or adjust their routing to the sink either a shortest path or a path adapted to some resource constrains with some existing routing protocol. Note that, the established routing path can accelerate the reporting. Once an event occurs, a report can be immediately relayed along the established routing path. 
Sensed Results Reporting Protocol
When a sensor node generates a report m after being triggered by a special event, e.g., a temperature change or in response to a query from the sink, it will send the report to the sink via an established routing. Assume that, the sensor (source) node N 0 has sensed some data m and is ready to report m to the sink via the routing path R N0 : Fig. 3 , the following protocol steps will be executed:
Step 1. The source node N 0 gains the current timestamp T , chooses k neighboring nodes N N0 : fN 1 ; N 2 ; . . . ; N k g, and sends the event ðm; T Þ and routing R N 0 to N N 0 .
Step 2. With ðm; T ; R N 0 Þ as input, each sensor node N i 2 ðN N 0 [ fN 0 gÞ invokes the Algorithm 2 to generate a row authentication vector Row i ¼ ðmac i1 ; mac i2 ; . . . ; mac il ; mac is Þ; ð9Þ
and reports Row i to the source node N 0 .
N i uses the non-interactive keypair establishment to compute shared keys with each node in R N0 : ½R 1 ! R 2 ! Á Á Á ! R l ! Sink as k i1 ; k i2 ; . . . ; k il ; k is , where k is is N i 's private key distributed by the sink 3:
if N i believes the report m is true then . a neighboring node is assumed having the same ability to detect a true event as the source node and correctly judge the report m.
4:
for j ¼ 1 to l do 5:
mac ij ¼ MACðmkT ; k ij ; 1Þ 6: end for 7:
mac is ¼ MACðmkT ; k is ; Þ 8:
for j ¼ 1 to l do 10:
mac ij is set as a random bit . . .
and reports ðm; T ; MACÞ as well as N N 0 to the sink along the routing R N0 .
En-Routing Filtering
When each sensor node R i , (1 i l), along the routing R N 0 receives ðm; T ; MACÞ from its upstream node, it checks the integrity of the message m and the timestamp T . If the timestamp T is out of date, the message ðm; T ; MACÞ will be discarded. Otherwise, R i invokes the Algorithm 3. If the returned value is "accept," R i will forward the message ðm; T ; MACÞ to its downstream node, Otherwise, ðm; T ; MACÞ will be discarded. R j uses the noninteractive keypair establishment to compute shared keys with each node in fN 0 ; N 1 ; . . . ; N k g as k 0j ; k 1j ; . . . ; k kj 3: set returnvalue = "accept" 4:
if mac ij È mac ij 6 ¼ 0 then 7: set returnvalue = "reject" 8:
end if 10:
end for 11:
return returnvalue 12: end procedure
Sink Verification
If the sink receives the report ðm; T ; MACÞ, it checks the integrity of the message m and the timestamp T . If the timestamp is out of date, the report ðm; T ; MACÞ will be immediately discarded. Otherwise, the sink looks up all private keys k is of N i , 0 i k, and invokes the Algorithm 4. If the returned value of Algorithm 4 is "accept," the sink accepts the report m; otherwise, the sink rejects the report. set returnvalue = "accept" 3:
for
return returnvalue 11: end procedure Reliability and scalability. For the BECAN scheme, once a compromised sensor node participates in the report confirmation, the report will be polluted and cannot reach the sink. To improve the reliability, multireports solution is naturally introduced in the BECAN scheme. As shown in Fig. 6a , once a true wildfire event occurs, multisource nodes close to the event independently choose k different neighbors, produce the multireports and send them to the sink via different paths. Only if one report reaches the sink, the true event will successfully reported. As a result, the reliability of the BECAN scheme can be improved. In the BECAN scheme, the additional ðl þ Þ Â ðk þ 1Þ authentication bits are in linear with the length of the path l. If l is too long, the authentication bits become large. To resolve the scalability issue, we can devise a large-scale sensor network into a heterogenous sensor network [28] , where each partition consists of a powerful High-end sensor (Hsensor) and a number of Low-end sensors (L-sensors), as shown in Fig. 6b . Each H-sensor serves as a cluster header. When a L-sensor senses some event, it can report to the nearby H-sensor, but not to the remote sink. Therefore, the heterogenous deployment can provide a good solution to the scalability issue of BECAN scheme.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the BECAN authentication scheme with respect to our main design goal, i.e., the effectiveness of filtering the injected false data.
Theoretical Analysis
Since the timestamp T is embedded in the report, the replay attack, a special injecting false data attack, can be filtered obviously. Therefore, how the BECAN scheme is resistent to the generic injecting false data attack will be studied here. Because the adversary A can compromise some sensor nodes in the network, without loss of generality, we assume the compromised probability for each sensor node is , and study the filtering probability.
Let
protocol, N 0 should select k neighboring sensor nodes to generate the authentication information MAC together, and then send ðm Ã ; T Ã ; MACÞ to the sink via the routing R N0 : ½R 1 ! R 2 ! Á Á Á ! R l ! Sink. In the selected k neighboring sensor nodes N N0 : fN 1 ; N 2 ; . . . ; N k g, as we know, with the probability ð k i Þ i ð1 À Þ kÀi , there are i compromised nodes. At the same time, in the routing R N0 , with the probability ð l j Þ j ð1 À Þ lÀj , there are j compromised nodes among l routing nodes. Because all keys are keyindependence, then in order to pass the false data ðm Ã ; T Ã ; MACÞ to the BECAN authentication, the sensor node N 0 must correctly guess all authentication bits between k À i uncompromised neighboring nodes and l À j uncompromised routing nodes plus the sink. Therefore, the guess probability is
Then, the false positive authentication probability is
Furthermore, we can obtain the filtering probability under this circumstance as
When ¼ 0, FP is rewritten as
which represents the en-routing filtering probability of the BECAN scheme and measures how much injected false data can be filtered as early as possible before their reaching the sink, in such a way the energy waster can be reduced, and the sink can avert the DoS attack due to large number of injected false data. Fig. 7 plots how the en-routing filtering probability FP R varies with the number of neighboring node k, the number of en-routing nodes l, and the compromised probability . From the figure, when k and l are properly set, FP R approaches to 1 in theory. However, in reality, when an experienced and astute adversary A launches an attack, it may first choose those compromised nodes as its neighbors participating in the injecting false data attack to increase the success probability, then the FP R would be reduced. Therefore, it is of interest to use simulation to evaluate the en-routing filtering probability FP R of the BECAN scheme. 
Simulation-Based En-Routing Filtering Evaluation
In the simulation, the en-routing filtering probability can be tested as 
In what follows, we provide the simulation results for FP R .
Simulation Settings
We study FP R of the BECAN scheme using a simulator built in Java. In the simulations, 1,000 sensor nodes with a transmission range R are randomly deployed in a CIR of region 200 Â 200 m 2 interest region. We consider each sensor node could be compromised with the probability . In Table 1 , we list the simulation parameters. Then, we test the networks when the number of en-routing nodes in the interest areas is varied from 5 to 15 in increment of 1. For each case, 10,000 networks are randomly generated, and the average of enrouting filtering probabilities over all of these randomly sampled networks are reported. Fig. 8 shows the en-routing filtering probability FP R in terms of different number of en-routing nodes. As the number of routing nodes increases, FP R increases. At the same time, by choosing more neighboring nodes involved in the protocol, i.e., the parameter k increases, FP R will further increase, even the compromised probability is 5 percent. Further observing the FP R with different transmission range R, we can see a relatively low FP R for R ¼ 20 m compared with that for R ¼ 15 m. The reason is that, under the same settings, when the transmission range increases, the number of compromised neighboring nodes will also increase, so the experienced and astute A has more chances to choose more compromised nodes participating in the attack to increase the success attack probability. Based on these observations, we have the following theorem. Theorem 1. The BECAN scheme can effectively resist the injecting false data attack launched by the experienced and astute A, only if the number of compromised nodes in the transmission range R is less than the security parameter k.
Simulation Results
Proof. From (13)- (14), we have the following relationship between FP and FP R , i.e.,
where 1 À FP R is the success probability of injecting false attack escaping from the en-routing filtering, which consists of two parts: 1) FPA jNc¼k , the false positive probability when the number of participating neighboring compromised nodes N c ¼ k in the attack, and 2) FPA jNc<k , the false positive probability when N c < k. Therefore, we have
When the parameter is well chosen, the item FPA jNc<k Á The en-routing filtering probability FP R as the functions of the number of neighboring nodes k and the compromised probability , and the number of en-routing node l and the compromised probability .
(a) FP R versus k and , (b) FP R versus l and . Fig. 8 . En-routing filtering probability FP R versus the different number of routing nodes l, where
TABLE 1 Parameter Settings
goal, i.e., the injected false data can be early detected and filtered by the en-routing sensor nodes. Thus, the energy wasted in relaying injected false data can be reduced.
Reliability of the BECAN scheme. In addition to the high (en-routing) filtering probability, the BECAN scheme also has high reliability, i.e., even though some sensor nodes are compromised, the true event reports still can reach the sink with high probability. Let FNR be the false negative rate on the true reports and tested as FNR ¼ number of true data that cannot reach the sink total number of true data :
If FNR is small, the BECAN scheme is demonstrated high reliability. Note that, selectively dropping true report attack [18] can increase the FNR. However, its adverse impact can affect any routing algorithm. Thus, for fairness, we only consider FNR that caused by 1) the number of uncompromised neighboring sensor nodes being less than k, or 2) some compromised sensor nodes polluting the true report. Fig. 10 shows the false negative rate FNR versus different number of reports. It can be seen, when the number of independent reports increases, the FNR decreases. Especially, when the number is five, the FNR is less than 10 percent. In reality, when a true wildfire event takes place, usually several independent entities report the event.
Thus, the multireports technology in BECAN scheme fits to the realistic scenarios. As a result, the BECAN scheme can achieve high reliability.
Discussion on Gang Injecting False Data Attack
In this section, we introduce a new stronger injecting false data attack, called gang injecting false data attack, in wireless sensor networks. This kind of attack is usually launched by a gang of compromised sensor nodes controlled and moved by an adversary A. As shown in Fig. 11 , when a compromised source node is ready to send a false data, several compromised nodes will first move and aggregate at the source node, and then collude to inject the false data. Because of the mobility, the gang injecting false data attack is more challenging and hard to resist. To tackle this kind of attack, a possible solution with the BECAN scheme is to require each participating sensor node to provide its position information. If the current position is not consistent with the previous ones, the gang attack can be detected. Nevertheless, how to prevent/mitigate the gang injecting false data attack from mobile compromised sensor nodes is still worthy of the further investigation.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Energy saving is always crucial for the lifetime of wireless sensor networks. In this section, the performance of the proposed BECAN scheme is evaluated in terms of energy efficiency.
Energy Consumption in Noninteractive Keypair Establishments
The additional computation costs of the proposed BECAN scheme are mainly due to the expensive ECDH operations during the noninteractive keypair establishments. Fortunately, since the noninteractive keypair establishments are averagely distributed in each sensor node and Fig. 9 . The filtering ratio at each routing node R i in R N0 , where 
Fig . 11 . Gang injecting false data attack.
only executed once during the routing establishment, the ECDH operation is not a heavy burden. When designing TinyECC-based sensor node, we can choose a 160-bit elliptic curve for achieving the same security level as 1,024-bit RSA [25] . Assume that, each sensor node is equipped with a low-power high performance sensor platform, i.e., MICAz [21] . Then, according to [19] , this type of sensor platform only requires 50.82 mJ to establish a noninteractive shared key.
Energy Consumption in Transmission
As shown in Fig. 8 , the majority of injected false data can be filtered by BECAN within 15 hops during transmission. Thus, BECAN can greatly save the energy of sensor nodes along the routing path. In order to quantitatively measure the energy saving in BECAN, we compare the energy consumption of BECAN with that of SEF within the length of routing path H ¼ 15 hops. For fair comparison, we set the parameter k ¼ 4, and 0, three among four neighboring nodes colluding with the compromised source node N 0 , which corresponds to N c ¼ 1; 4 with T ¼ 5 in SEF [9] . Because SEF does not consider the compromise of enrouting nodes, we also set ¼ 0 in BECAN. Let p be the probability to detect and drop an injected false data at each en-routing node. Then, the expected probability of false data being detected within h hops is p h ¼ 1 À ð1 À pÞ h . Let X be the number of hops that an injected false data can traverse. Then, the average number of hops that an injected false data traverse within total H hops is given as
Note that, when four and one compromised nodes collude in BECAN, the detection probability p are 1 À 1=2 5À4 ¼ 1=2, 1 À 1=2 5À1 ¼ 15=16, respectively; while in SEF, 1 p is usually suggested as 1=20, 1=5 for N c ¼ 4 and 1, respectively [9] .
Let L m ¼ 24 bytes be the length of a report m without any extra field, L a the additional authentication overhead, and E u the energy consumption in transmitting and receiving one byte. Also, we assume that there are 10 3 legitimate data traffic and 10 3 Â injected false data traffic, where , ð1 10Þ, is the normalized amount of injected traffic. Then, the energy consumed to deliver all traffic without BECAN/SEF will be
and the average energy consumption with BECAN/SEF will be
Let the lengths of key index, identity, and timestamp in BECAN/SEF be 10 bits, respectively. Then, L a in BECAN and SEF are 135 bits, 144 bits, respectively. According to [21] , the measurements show that MICAz node consumes 19.7 mA current when receiving, and 14 mA when transmitting. Based on the battery voltage (3 V) and data rate (32 Kbps), we can calculate that it takes to 10:5=14:77 J to transmit/receive a byte. Then, E u ¼ 25:27 J. If we use RC5 [25] for MAC computation, each computation consumes about 15 J [9] . By plugging the energy consumed in MAC computation in (21), we can plot the energy consumptions as a function of the normalized amount of injected traffic with the total traffic 10 3 ð1 þ Þ within H ¼ 15 hops in Fig. 12 . From the figure, we can observe that the proposed BECAN scheme can save more energy than SEF, especially when is large. The reason is that the proposed BECAN scheme has larger p than SEF. Based on (19) , the average numbers of hops that an injected false data can traverse are 1, 2 hops for p ¼ 15=16; 1=2, respectively, in BECAN, and 4:5; 7 hops for p ¼ 1=5; 1=20, respectively, in SEF, and thus, more energy will be saved in BECAN. Based on the above analysis, we can see the proposed BECAN scheme is indeed an efficient authentication scheme for filtering injected false data in wireless sensor networks.
RELATED WORK
Recently, some research works on bandwidth-efficient filtering of injected false data in wireless sensor networks have been appeared in the literature in [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . In [9] , Ye et al. propose a statistical en-routing filtering mechanism called SEF. SEF requires that each sensing report be validated by multiple keyed message authenticated (MACs), each generated by a node that detectes the same event. As the report being forwarded, each node along the way verifies the correctness of the MACs at earliest point. If the injected false data escapes the en-routing filtering and is delivered to the sink, the sink will further verify the correctness of each MAC carried in each report and reject false ones. In SEF, to verify the MACs, each node gets a random subset of the keys of size k from the global key pool of size N and uses them to producing the MACs. To save the bandwidth, SEF adopts the bloom filter to reduce the MAC size. By simulation, SEF can prevent the injecting false data attack with 80-90 percent probability within 10 hops. However, since n should not be large enough as described above, the filtering probability at each en-routing node p ¼ kðT ÀNcÞ N is relatively low. Besides, SEF does not consider the possibility of en-routing nodes' compromise, which is also crucial to the false data filtering. In [10] , Zhu et al. present an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication (IHA) scheme for filtering of injected false data. In IHA, each node is associated with two other nodes along the path, one is the lower association node, and the other is the upper association node. An en-routing node will forward received report if it is successfully verified by its lower association node. To reduce the size of the report, the scheme compresses t þ 1 individual MACs by XORing them to one. By analyses, only if less than t nodes are compromised, the sink can detect the injected false data. However, the security of the scheme is mainly contingent upon the creation of associations in the association discovery phase. Once the creation fails, the security cannot be guaranteed. In addition, as pointed in [7] , Zhu et al.'s scheme, similar as SEF, also adopts the symmetric keys from a key pool, which allows the compromised nodes to abuse these keys to generate false reports. Location-Based Resilient Secrecy (LBRS) is proposed by Yang et al. [11] , which adopts location key binding mechanism to reduce the damage caused by node compromise, and further mitigate the false data generation in wireless sensor networks. In [12] , Ren et al. propose more efficient location-aware end-to-end data security design (LEDS) to provide end-to-end security guarantee including efficient en-routing false data filtering capability and high-level assurance on data availability. Because LEDS is a symmetric key based solution, to achieve en-routing filtering, it requires location-aware key management, where each node should share at least one authentication key with one node in its upstream/downstream reportauth cell. In [13] , Zhang et al. provide a public key based solution to the same problem. Especially, they propose the notion of location-based keys by binding private keys of individual nodes to both their IDs and geographic locations and a suite of location-based compromise-tolerant security mechanisms. To achieve en-routing filtering, additional 20 bytes authentication overheads are required.
Bit-compressed authentication technology can achieve bandwidth-efficient, which has been adopted in some research works [29] , [30] . In [29] , Canetti et al. use one-bit authentication to achieve multicast security. The basic idea in multicast is very similar to the BECAN scheme, where a source knows a set of keys R ¼ fK 1 ; . . . ; K l g, each recipient u knows a subset R u & R. When the source sends a message M, it authenticates M with each of the keys, using a MAC. That is, a message M is accompanied with hMACðK 1 ; MÞ; . . . ; MACðK l ; MÞi. Each recipient u verifies all the MACs which were created using the keys in its subset R u . If any of these MACs is incorrect, the message M will be rejected. To achieve the bandwidth efficiency, each MAC is compressed as single bit. The security of the scheme is based on the assumption that the source is not compromised. However, once the source is compromised, the scheme obviously does not work. Therefore, it cannot be applied to filter false data injected by compromised nodes in wireless sensor networks. In [30] , Benenson et al. also use 1-bit MACs to decide whether a query is legitimate in wireless sensor networks. However, similar as that in [29] , once the source is compromised, the 1-bit MACs also does not work. Different from the above works, the proposed BECAN scheme adopts CNR based filtering mechanism together with multireports technology. Because of noninteractive key establishment, BECAN does not require a complicated security association [10] , [12] . In addition, BECAN considers the scenario that each node could be compromised with probability , i.e., some en-routing nodes could be compromised. To avoid putting all eggs in one basket, BECAN distributes the en-routing authentication to all sensor nodes along the routing path. To save the bandwidth, it also adopts the bit-compressed authentication technique. Therefore, it is compromise-tolerant and suitable for filtering false data in wireless sensor networks.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel BECAN scheme for filtering the injected false data. By theoretical analysis and simulation evaluation, the BECAN scheme has been demonstrated to achieve not only high en-routing filtering probability but also high reliability with multi-reports. Due to the simplicity and effectiveness, the BECAN scheme could be applied to other fast and distributed authentication scenarios, e.g., the efficient authentication in wireless mesh network [31] . In our future work, we will investigate how to prevent/mitigate the gang injecting false data attack from mobile compromised sensor nodes [32] .
APPENDIX
We will show how to use Dijkstra algorithm to calculate and store the shortest path ðv i Þ for each sensor node v i 2 V=fv 1 g to the sink v 1 .
Algorithm 5. Dijkstra's Single Source All Shortest Path 1: procedure DIJKSTRA (G ¼ ðV; EÞ) 2:
for each vertex v i 2 e V do 4:
end for 6:
for each edge e ij 2 E do 7: if e ij ¼¼ 1 then 8:
else . e ij ¼¼ 0 10:
end if . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
